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0. Introduction  
This paper concerns three different debates: the first is a debate over the nature of 
representation in thought; the second is a debate over the connection between a subject’s 
moral judgements and her motivation to act; and the third is a debate over the connection 
between a subject’s reasons for action and her subjective motivational set. Each of these 
debates is categorised as a debate between internalism (about a particular subject-matter) and 
externalism (about that subject-matter), and, perhaps unsurprisingly, they share a common 
structure. Each of the various internalisms prioritises the perspective of the individual in 
some way, whereas each of the various externalisms emphasises the importance of facts that 
may well lie outside the individual’s perspective. The debates have largely received 
independent treatment2, perhaps on the grounds that the connection between the debates runs 
no deeper than the structural similarity stated; but the connection between the debates is more 
than merely structural.  
I take the first debate—the debate over the nature of representation in thought—to be 
primary.3 This is, first, because the other two debates presuppose that there are 
representational states: moral judgements that may or may not be internally connected to 
motivation; and sets of beliefs and desires that may or may not provide reasons for action. 
But the very possibility of representation in thought depends on an externalist understanding 
of representational states. And this takes us to the second, and more fundamental, reason for 
                                                             
1 Versions of this paper were presented at the University of Sussex Philosophy Society and at the SIFA 
Graduate Conference held at the University of Cagliari. Thanks to audiences on both occasions. Particular 
thanks go to Michael Morris for characteristically helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
2 Notable exceptions are to be found in Majors and Sawyer (2007), and Greenberg (2009). 
3 There is a sense in which perceptual representation is more fundamental still. However, I leave perceptual 
representation to one side in this paper and focus instead on conceptual representation because the connection 
with the other debates only emerges at the conceptual level. Arguments in favour of the world-dependence of 
perceptual content parallel a strand of argument in favour of the world-dependence of conceptual content. See 
Burge (1986b), (1986c) and (1988). See also Davies (1991) and (1992). 
the primacy of the debate over the nature of representation. Once it is understood that 
representational content is essentially individuated with reference to relations between the 
subject and her environment, a resolution to the other debates comes into view. An externalist 
understanding of representation in thought has the resources to overcome the apparent 
disagreements evident in the debates concerning moral judgement and reasons for action.  
 The general aim of the paper is to elucidate the more-than-merely-structural 
connection between the debates, and in particular to show that representational externalism 
binds the debates inextricably together. The more specific aim of the paper is to elaborate a 
new moral theory, which I call ‘moral externalism’, that emerges from consideration of 
externalism about representational content. In section 1, I characterize an externalist theory of 
representational content. I won’t offer direct arguments for the view, since, aside from having 
argued for it elsewhere4, the main purpose of the paper is to show how externalism about 
representational content impacts on the two debates in moral philosophy. The paper as a 
whole, however, constitutes an indirect argument for externalism about representational 
content on the grounds that it can explain away the apparent disagreement in the two debates 
in moral philosophy. In section 2, I set up the debate concerning the connection between 
moral judgement and motivation, and show how an externalist theory of representation can 
resolve it. In section 3, I show how the resulting view of the connection between moral 
judgement and motivation can itself resolve the debate concerning the connection between a 
subject’s reasons for action and her subjective motivational set. I conclude in section 4. 
 
1. Representational Content in Thought 
This section provides an initial characterization of externalism about representational content 
in thought.5 I start with a simple example. One thing I believe is that penguins can’t fly. My 
capacity to believe this clearly depends on my having the concept penguin—if I didn’t have 
the concept penguin, then I couldn’t have any thoughts involving the concept penguin, which 
is to say, I couldn’t have any thoughts about penguins as penguins. But what does my 
possession of the concept penguin depend on? According to externalism about 
representational content, relations between a thinker and her external environment play an 
essential role in determining her concepts. The fact that I have the concept penguin, for 
example, depends in part, but essentially, on the fact that I have been related in the right kind 
                                                             
4 See Sawyer (2007) and (2011). 
5 For the classic arguments for externalism about representational content, see Burge (1979), (1982) and (1986a). 
See Putnam (1973) for a precursor to these arguments. 
of way to penguins themselves; I have read about them, visited them in zoos, watched 
programs about them, heard stories about them, and so on. And if there had been no penguins 
around anywhere, then, plausibly, I couldn’t have possessed the concept penguin. After all, 
how could I have acquired it?  
This simple line of thought does not apply to every possible concept—it is no doubt 
possible to possess a concept in the absence of entities to which that concept applies.6 This is 
consistent with an externalist understanding of the nature of representation. The externalist 
claim is simply that there could be no representation in thought without some relations to an 
environment. This line of thought is sometimes backed by the example of the chemist who 
possesses the concept water despite living in a world with no water. If her world contained 
hydrogen and oxygen, and she possessed concepts of each of these elements, it is suggested, 
she could come to possess the concept water in virtue of theorizing about hydrogen and 
oxygen combining in the appropriate ratio. The example appears originally in Burge (1982), 
and has been cited prolifically since, with almost universal assent. But the example is 
problematic. To my mind, such a theorizer might come to possess the concept H20, which 
represents water, but could not come to possess the concept water. The example errs in 
treating water as a reducible concept, which it is not. Water may be identical to H2O, but 
water is not identical to H2O. While compound concepts, such as H20, can be possessed in 
the absence of their instances, irreducible concepts cannot. Understood correctly, the example 
does provide support for the claim that a concept can be possessed by an individual who has 
had no contact with its instances, since the chemist in the example could come to possess the 
concept H2O, which is a natural kind concept but one that lacks application in her world. 
Possession of a fundamental, irreducible concept, in contrast, depends essentially on causal 
relations to its instances.7 
 The externalist thinks of concepts as public rather than private. You and I may both 
have the concept penguin, and may both believe that penguins can’t fly, but we may 
nonetheless have somewhat different understandings of what penguins are—different beliefs 
about whether they all live in cold climates, what they eat, how many varieties there are, 
whether the different varieties can interbreed, whether they’re all basically black and white, 
and so on. But despite these differences, according to the externalist understanding of 
                                                             
6 For further discussion of an externalist treatment of empty concepts, see Sawyer (2003). But see Sawyer (2014) 
for an argument to the effect that fictional predicates, such as ‘x is a hobbit’, ‘x is a wizard’, etc. do not express 
concepts at all. 
7 It is the principle that is important at this juncture, rather than agreement over cases. For the record, I regard 
penguin as a fundamental, irreducible concept, but my view here is hostage to empirical theory. There is 
insufficient space to elaborate on this here. 
concepts as public, it’s still penguins that we’re thinking about, and this in part because of our 
causal connections to penguins. It’s clear that people have slightly different surrounding 
beliefs about most things most of the time, but that doesn’t prevent us from thinking about 
the same things. Externalism about representational content explains how this is possible. 
According to the externalist, grasp of a concept comes in degrees, and the extent to which one 
grasps a concept varies with one’s knowledge of the nature of the things that fall under the 
concept. The more one knows about penguins, the better one grasps the concept penguin. 
 This conception of concepts has normative implications. According to the externalist, 
the way in which one ought to apply a concept has to be responsive to the nature of the things 
the concept represents—to the nature of penguins, for instance. These conceptual norms are 
universal; they govern how one ought to apply a given concept irrespective of how good a 
grasp of the concept one has. This means that it cannot ultimately be deference to experts that 
determines how one ought to apply a concept.8 Consulting an expert can help to improve 
one’s knowledge only insofar as the expert is genuinely knowledgeable about the subject 
matter, and hence consulting an expert can help one to grasp a concept more fully only 
insofar as the expert’s grasp of the concept is better than one’s own; but, crucially, the experts 
too may get things wrong – sometimes significantly wrong. It is not the experts that 
determine how one ought to apply concepts, then, but the way the world is. 
This brief characterization highlights three main aspects of the externalist theory. First, 
what an individual represents in thought depends in part, but essentially, on relations she 
bears to her environment.9 Second, an individual can think with a concept that she grasps 
incompletely. Third, thought is governed by norms that do not derive from the subjective 
resources, abilities, capacities, and so on, of the individual thinker. The norms of thought 
derive in part from the nature of the world beyond the individual.  
 
2. Moral Judgement and Motivation 
With this brief characterization of externalism about representational content in hand, I now 
turn to the second internalism / externalism debate, which concerns the connection between 
moral judgement and motivation. Moral judgements are ones that involve moral concepts 
                                                             
8 The phrase is derived from Putnam’s hypothesis of the division of linguistic labour. See Putnam (1973). 
9 I think that the relations that a subject must bear to her environment in order to acquire empirical concepts are 
of necessity non-conceptual relations. For an articulation of this view see Burge (1977) and (1982). The 
fundamentality of non-conceptual relations is rejected by McDowell in his (1984) and (1986). However, the key, 
unifying externalist thought is that externalism allows for difference of degree of concept-mastery, and that 
requires that the targets of our thoughts have their natures fixed independently of any particular conception we 
have of them.  
such as right, wrong, good and bad (so-called ‘thin’ moral concepts), and ones that involve 
moral concepts such as fairness, kindness, spite, discretion, blame, guilt, enterprise, industry, 
assiduity, treachery, promise, offence, brutality, malice, courage, deceit, gratitude, and 
exploitation (examples of so-called ‘thick’ moral concepts).10 Moral judgements—
judgements involving such concepts—appear to be motivating. It is clear that in many cases, 
at least, once we make a sincere moral judgement to the effect that a certain course of action 
is right or wrong, we are motivated at least to some extent to act accordingly. For example, 
having judged that it’s right to recycle cardboard rather than throwing it away, I was 
motivated to take my cardboard to the recycling centre rather than leaving it out with the 
rubbish; and having judged that it’s wrong to eat meat, I was motivated to stop eating meat. 
Similarly, having promised to call a friend, I was motivated to do so; and having judged that I 
had unwittingly caused offence, I was motivated to apologise. There is something peculiar 
about a person who claims to make these kinds of moral judgements and yet shows no 
inclination to act in accordance with them; indeed, we are likely to regard the proclamations 
of such a person as insincere. That there is a connection between moral judgement and 
motivation is generally agreed. It is the nature of the connection that is disputed.11  
 According to the motivational judgement internalist, the connection between moral 
judgement and motivation is an ‘internal’ or conceptual one12: that is, it is a conceptual truth 
that moral judgements motivate.13 According to strong motivational judgement internalism, 
necessarily, if an individual makes a sincere moral judgement, then she will be overridingly  
motivated to act in accordance with it. According to weak motivational judgement 
internalism—on the face of it a more plausible view—necessarily, if an individual makes a 
sincere moral judgement, then she will be motivated to some extent to act in accordance with 
                                                             
10 I take no stand here on whether the alleged distinction between thick and thin moral concepts is absolute or 
even theoretically significant.  
11 The question of how moral judgements are connected to motivation is inherently bound up with two other 
questions: one concerning whether moral judgements are beliefs (the cognitivism / non-cognitivism debate); the 
other concerning whether there are objective moral truths (the moral realism / anti-realism debate). I leave these 
issues to one side for the moment, but will return to them towards the end of section 4. 
12 Brink (1989: p. 42) distinguishes three internalist claims here: (i) that the connection between moral 
judgement and motivation is necessary; (ii) that the necessary connection is a priori; and (iii) that the 
motivational power of moral judgements cannot depend on substantive facts (e.g. about the content of morality, 
the nature of rationality, or the nature of moral agents). In what follows I will largely ignore these differences 
and talk merely of the connection as being conceptual.  
13 Internalism admits of many possible versions. For a thorough taxonomy see Brink (1989: chap.3). For 
versions of internalism see Blackburn (1984) and (1998), Hume (1739: III, I, 1), Falk (1947), Foot (1958a) and 
(1958b), Hare (1952: chap.5), Harman (1977), Mackie (1977: chap. 1), McDowell (1978), (1979) and (1985), 
McNaughton (1988), Nagel (1970) and Smith (1994). 
it. This allows that the motivation may be outweighed by conflicting motivations and 
defeated by mental maladies such as depression, extreme exhaustion, and so on.14  
 Motivational judgement externalism is simply the denial of motivational judgement 
internalism.15  As such, the connection between moral judgement and motivation is taken to 
be external in the sense that whether or not one is motivated depends on factors external to 
the moral judgement itself—for example, motivation might be taken to depend on contingent 
facts about one’s desires, human psychology more generally, or even the nature of 
rationality.16 
 The difference between internalism and externalism emerges most graphically in 
consideration of a character called ‘the amoralist’. The amoralist is someone who, we are told, 
is able to use moral terms to classify actions, character traits, states of affairs, and so on just 
as other people do, but is not motivated in the least to act appropriately. The amoralist might 
judge that it’s right to recycle, but nonetheless lack any motivation to do so; and the amoralist 
might judge that it’s wrong to eat meat, but nonetheless lack any motivation to stop doing so. 
Motivational externalists maintain that the amoralist is possible—they maintain that there is 
no conceptual incoherence in making a moral judgement and failing to be motivated to act in 
accordance with it. This is because the connection between moral judgement and motivation 
is an external, i.e. non-conceptual one. The amoralist might, for instance, simply lack the 
desires that in most of us serve to connect our moral judgements and our motivations. 
Motivational internalists, in contrast, reject the very coherence of the amoralist, since, 
according to motivational judgement internalists, the connection between moral judgement 
and motivation is an internal, conceptual one. As such, they are forced to re-describe the 
apparent examples of the amoralist as ones that either involve some low-level or masked 
motivation despite appearances to the contrary, or do not really involve moral judgements, 
again despite appearances to the contrary. On this latter front, for example, the internalist 
might maintain that the so-called ‘amoralist’ does not judge that it’s right to recycle 
cardboard—he judges that recycling cardboard is what other people call ‘right’; and this, of 
                                                             
14 Weakness of will is often cited as a potential interfering factor, but given the complexities surrounding the 
concept of weakness of will, I leave it to one side here. It is an implication of my view that someone with a full 
grasp of all the moral concepts could not suffer from weakness of will. I do not have the space to explore this 
idea further here. 
15 For varieties of externalism see Brink (1986), (1989) and (1997), Foot (1972), Mele (1996), Shafer-Landau 
(1998), (2000) and (2003), Stocker (1979), Svavarsdóttir (1999), and Zangwill (2003). 
16 There is a complication in classification here, since some take the defeasibility of moral motivation under 
conditions such as depression or extreme exhaustion to be consistent with internalism (e.g. Smith 1994), 
whereas others take it to support externalism (e.g. Shafer-Landau 2003). The complication is eradicated if, as I 
suggest, there is a synthesised view that emerges from externalism about representational content. 
course, is not a moral judgement at all, since it involves the application of no moral 
concepts.17 
The nature of the connection between moral judgement and motivation on the one 
hand, and the coherence or incoherence of the amoralist on the other, appear to be two sides 
of the same coin. However, I want to suggest that there is no inconsistency in maintaining 
both that the connection between moral judgement and motivation is conceptual (as the 
internalist does), and that the amoralist is conceptually coherent (as the externalist does). 
How can this be? An externalist account of representational content provides the answer, as 
follows. Moral judgements involve moral concepts; moral concepts (just like non-moral 
concepts) are representational and hence externally individuated; and as such, individual 
thinkers can think with a moral concept that they grasp only incompletely. Even if a subject 
who grasped a moral concept fully would be motivated to act, since it is possible to make a 
moral judgement involving a concept that one does not fully grasp, it is possible to make a 
moral judgement but fail to be motivated. Greenberg illustrates this with the following 
example18: 
 
Consider Alice, a moral and political philosopher with a strong libertarian streak. 
She develops an elaborate moral theory according to which liberty is the 
fundamental value, and equality is not a value at all. In working out the 
consequences of the theory, she forms the hypothesis that considerations of 
fairness are really considerations of equality in another guise. She finds some 
arguments that support the hypothesis.  Eventually, she comes to question 
whether fairness is a moral virtue, indeed whether it is a reason for action of any 
kind. Accordingly, she loses the belief that fairness is a reason for action. 
Alice believes that it is important to bring one’s motivations and actions into 
line with one’s beliefs, and she is good at accomplishing this in her own case. 
Because of her doubt about whether fairness is a reason for action, she apparently 
loses any disposition to be motivated to perform fair actions qua fair. ... She also 
apparently loses any disposition to feel resentment or indignation at unfairness. 
(Greenberg 2009: 140) 
 
                                                             
17 See Smith (1994: p. 76). For discussion see Brink (1997), Copp (1997), Cuneo (1999), Sayre-McCord (1997) 
and Smith (1997). 
18 The basic point is also made in brief in Majors and Sawyer (2007). 
After the change in her theoretical views, Alice continues to make generally accurate 
judgements about whether particular actions, procedures and so on are fair—that is, she 
continues to make moral judgements involving the concept fair—but she is no longer 
motivated appropriately by the judgements because subsequent to the development of her 
new theory, she ceases to recognise their moral force. It looks here, then, as if we have a case 
of moral judgement without motivation, and this precisely because we have a subject who 
grasps a moral concept incompletely.19  
What might the motivational internalist say in response? There are four prima facie 
possibilities. First, she might say that subsequent to the development of her new theory, Alice 
lacks the concept of fairness. But this is implausible. Alice has consistent views about which 
procedures and rules are fair both before and after she develops her moral theory, and her 
views are standard. Indeed, Alice is most naturally described as having developed a theory 
precisely about (amongst other things) fairness. Alice simply no longer thinks that fairness is 
a moral virtue. Second, the motivational internalist might say that while it looks as if Alice’s 
judgements about fairness are the same both before and after the development of her theory, 
in fact, what look to be judgements of fairness after the development of her theory are in fact 
judgements merely about what other people call ‘fair’. But this, too, is implausible. Alice 
hasn’t changed her mind about the nature of fairness—she’s changed her mind about whether 
or not fairness has any moral worth. Third, the motivational internalist might say that Alice 
retains her motivation to act in accordance with her judgements about fairness, but that some 
interfering factor is, after the development of her theory, preventing her motivation from 
manifesting itself. But what could this interfering factor be? Alice is not suffering from any 
of the standard maladies associated with interfering factors, such as depression or extreme 
exhaustion, for instance. Her lack of motivation is, rather, best explained by her false 
theoretical beliefs. But having false theoretical beliefs cannot plausibly be taken to constitute 
an interfering factor analogous to suffering from depression or extreme exhaustion. It is 
implausible, then, to think that Alice retains her motivation. Finally, the motivational 
internalist might say that Alice’s judgements about fairness and unfairness cease to be moral 
judgements after she develops her moral theory. But this response is also inadequate, since 
fairness is a moral virtue; and this entails that judgements involving the concept fair are 
                                                             
19 Externalism about representational content has been argued for on three grounds: (i) a subject’s ignorance of 
the underlying microstructure of a kind; (ii) a subject’s ignorance of expert knowledge about a kind; and (iii) a 
subject’s non-standard theory about a kind. Plausibly, only (ii) and (iii) apply in the moral case. This does not, 
however, mark a significant difference between moral and non-moral concepts, since (i) only applies to 
reducible kind concepts. 
moral judgements regardless of who makes them, and hence regardless of whether the subject, 
like Alice, fails to see that they are. A concept’s status as a moral concept does not shift from 
one occasion of use to another in accordance with the variable beliefs of the thinkers who 
deploy it. 
That Alice’s judgements should be regarded as moral judgements is backed by 
consideration of the internalist claim that moral consideration is internally connected to 
motivation. Put in terms of moral consideration, the internalist claim is ambiguous as 
between (C1) a subject who recognises a moral consideration is thereby motivated, and (C2) 
a subject who deploys a moral concept is thereby motivated. My interpretation of the 
example of Alice assumes that the correct way to understand the internalist claim is as (C2). 
This must be right. It is deployment of moral concepts—whether or not one recognises them 
as moral concepts—that is essentially connected to motivation. To see this, consider the 
alternative, (C1). (C1) says that a subject who recognises a moral consideration is thereby 
motivated. But (C1) is in fact itself ambiguous, having a strong and a weak reading. The 
strong reading is a reading according to which a subject who recognises a moral 
consideration—for example, recognises that fairness is a moral consideration, is thereby 
motivated. But this strong reading is simply too strong to be plausible. First, it would require 
that subjects possess a conceptual understanding of morality that is beyond that which is 
required of those making moral judgements; second, recognising that fairness is a moral 
consideration is recognition without an application to a particular state of affairs, and 
therefore can have no direct implications for motivation. The weak reading of (C1), on the 
other hand, is a reading according to which a subject who recognises a moral consideration—
for example that a certain action is unfair, is thereby motivated, but this is equivalent to (C2). 
Alice is similar in spirit to what Brink has called a principled amoralist. He writes, 
‘Because moral motivation is predicated on the assumption that moral requirements generate 
reasons for action or have rational authority, it is possible to make moral judgements and yet 
remain unmoved as long as there are possible conceptions of morality and practical reason 
according to which moral requirements need not have rational authority.’ (1997: p. 18) This 
he contrasts with an unprincipled amoralist, who fails to be motivated because of interfering 
psychological factors such as depression or extreme exhaustion. Alice, however, is a different 
kind of principled amoralist than the one Brink conceives. Alice is a principled amoralist not 
because she comes to question the rational authority of moral judgements—we can stipulate 
that she consistently takes moral judgements to be authoritative—rather, she is a principled 
amoralist because she believes of some of her moral judgements that they are not moral 
judgements. 
The example shows that a good-willed person can make a moral judgement (that a 
particular state of affairs is unfair, say) and yet fail to be motivated to act accordingly. The 
lack of motivation is to be explained by the incomplete grasp of the moral concept involved 
in the moral judgement. It is because Alice has a false moral theory, and hence an incomplete 
grasp of the relevant concept, that she fails to be motivated by her moral judgements about 
fairness. In this way, the possibility of the amoralist can be seen to be consistent with there 
being a conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation. We might state the 
conceptual connection as follows:  
 
Externalist motivational internalism (EMI): necessarily, if an individual makes 
a sincere moral judgement, and she has a full grasp of the concepts involved in 
that moral judgement, then she will be motivated to some extent to act in 
accordance with it.  
 
(EMI) draws essentially on externalism about representational content to maintain an internal 
connection between moral judgement and motivation consistent with the possibility of the 
amoralist.  
 
3. Moral Reasons and Motivation  
I turn now to the third internalism / externalism debate. The question at issue between the 
reasons internalist and the reasons externalist is the question of whether a subject’s normative 
reasons for action necessarily derive from her subjective motivational set—from facts about 
what she is or can be motivated to do, from motivational attitudes that she either has or would 
have under certain idealised conditions.20 The reasons internalist maintains that a subject’s 
normative reasons for action do indeed necessarily derive from her subjective motivational 
set.21 The reasons externalist, in contrast, maintains that a subject’s normative reasons exist 
independently of her individual motives.22 Both positions have some intuitive appeal. The 
internalist position is supported by the natural thought that reasons for action must be capable 
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reasons. A subject’s motivating, or explanatory reasons are trivially connected to her subjective motivational set. 
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Smith (1995) and Williams (1980).  
22 For versions of reasons externalism see Dancy (2000), Gert (2004), Parfit (1997) and Scanlon (1998).  
of moving an agent to act—that there is a kind of incoherence in the notion of a reason for 
action that cannot motivate. This position is often linked to the Humean theory of motivation, 
according to which desires are essential for action. The externalist position, in contrast, is 
supported by the natural thought that recognition of a reason to act is recognition of a 
consideration in favour of acting—that is, recognition of some objective value that exists 
independently of one’s motives. Thus, it might be thought that a child has a reason to own up 
to breaking the vase, a reason not to cheat at snakes and ladders, a reason to hand in the toy 
she found in the playground, a reason to share her sweets and so on, even if she has no desire 
to do any of them, and is not in the least bit motivated to do so. After all, one might think, 
owning up, playing fairly, handing in lost property and sharing are all, at least in certain 
circumstances, the right things to do, and this provides, in those circumstances, a normative 
reason to do them.  
Despite the fact that both positions have some intuitive appeal, prima facie one must 
choose between them—between reasons that are essentially motivational because subjective, 
and reasons that are essentially divorced from motivation because objective. Thus we are 
faced with a theoretically unsatisfactory dilemma. Internalism provides a relatively 
straightforward answer to the question of how morality can be authoritative and action-
guiding, because an agent’s moral reasons, like her normative reasons generally, derive from 
her motivational states. But, as a consequence, internalism has difficulty in accounting for the 
apparent objectivity of moral reasons, since internalism seems to imply that what one ought 
to do depends essentially on what one wants to do, rather than on independent, objective 
moral reasons. In contrast, externalism is consistent with the objectivity of moral reasons, 
since reasons are assumed not to derive from the subjective motivational sets of individual 
subjects. But, as a result, externalism faces the question of how morality can be action-
guiding, since objective moral reasons may be ones which are entirely disconnected from an 
individual’s subjective motivational set, and hence ones which could play no role in guiding 
her actions. 
I want to suggest a resolution to the debate by drawing on the thesis of externalist 
motivational internalism (EMI), with its essential reliance on externalism about 
representational content, as set out in section 2.23 (EMI) opens up the possibility that a 
subject’s normative reasons for action may be necessarily connected to her subjective 
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are taken to be external to the individual but internal to human nature. In my own hybrid view, reasons are more 
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motivational set, even though not derived from her subjective motivational set. Consequently, 
it opens up the possibility that moral reasons may be both objective and essentially action-
guiding. On this view, we could agree with the reasons externalist that normative reasons for 
action do not derive from an individual’s subjective motivational set, maintaining, rather, that 
normative reasons for action derive from the way the world is—from the very nature of 
morality. And we could also agree with the reasons internalist that reasons must be 
essentially capable of motivating. Here, as a reminder, is (EMI): 
 
Externalist motivational internalism (EMI): necessarily, if an individual makes 
a sincere moral judgement, and she has a full grasp of the concepts involved in 
that moral judgement, then she will be motivated to some extent to act in 
accordance with it.  
 
And here is how the reconciliation concerning the nature of reasons can be derived. 
According to (EMI), a subject who possessed a full grasp of the moral concepts would be 
motivated to act in accordance with her sincere moral judgements. But given externalism 
about representational content, a subject who possessed a full grasp of the moral concepts 
would necessarily have a full understanding of the nature of morality. Consequently, the 
moral judgements of such a subject would of necessity be correct moral judgements. But 
correct moral judgements just are judgements the content of which state objective reasons for 
acting. As such, objective reasons would be motivating for such a subject precisely because 
objective reasons would provide the content of her moral judgements, which are, according to 
(EMI), essentially motivating and action-guiding.  Moreover, the fact that objective reasons 
would provide the content of her moral judgements and hence be action-guiding for such a 
subject is not accidental; rather, she would make those judgements precisely because they 
state moral truths and hence provide objective moral reasons to act. Moral reasons, on this 
picture, are external to the subject in the sense that they do not derive from her subjective 
motivational set—they are reasons for her no matter what her motivations—but internal to 
her in the sense that were she to possess a full grasp of the moral concepts, the reasons would 
feature in her motivational set as the content of her moral judgements. The necessary 
connection between a moral reason and an individual’s subjective motivational set can, then, 
be stated as follows: 
 
Externalist reasons internalism (ERI): necessarily, if an individual makes a 
sincere moral judgement, and she has a full grasp of the concepts involved in that 
moral judgement, then the content of her moral judgement will state an external, 
objective normative reason to act.  
 
(ERI), like (EMI), relies essentially on externalism about representational content. The 
resulting view provides a necessary connection between external reasons and an individual’s 
subjective motivational set. Clearly we do not in general have a full grasp of all (or even any) 
moral concepts. However, since grasping a concept is a matter of degree and goes hand in 
hand with one’s understanding of the subject-matter in question, one’s subjective 
motivational set will be related to genuine normative reasons for action to the extent that one 
grasps moral concepts, and hence to the extent that one understands the nature of morality, 
which is to say, the extent to which one has moral knowledge. On this view, a subject who 
fails to be motivated by moral reasons is not irrational, but simply lacking in moral 
knowledge.  
 The conjunction of (EMI) and (ERI), with their essential reliance on externalism 
about representational content, forms a distinctive moral view that I will call ‘moral 
externalism’. Moral externalism is a form of moral cognitivism, since it is committed to the 
claim that moral judgements are truth-evaluable; it embodies a rejection of the Humean 
theory of motivation, since it is committed to the claim that moral judgements (beliefs) can 
motivate in the absence of desires24; and it embodies a robust form of moral realism, since it 
presupposes that moral concepts refer to objective moral properties.25 Traditionally, of course, 
motivational judgement internalism and reasons internalism have each been used to argue 
against moral realism.26  But if I am right, there is a way to preserve the necessary connection 
between moral judgement and motivation on the one hand, and reasons and subjective 
motivational sets on the other, consistent with moral realism. Despite the fact that moral 
externalism embodies a robust form of moral realism, it would be a mistake to think that 
moral externalism is committed to the codifiability of moral principles.27  Moral externalism 
is committed neither to the claim that there are exceptionless general moral principles, nor to 
the claim that there is a systematic procedure for determining in a given context the correct 
                                                             
24 See Shafer-Landau (2003) for an argument to the effect that both moral and non-moral beliefs can motivate. 
25 I take moral concepts to be irreducible, but do not think that the irreducibility of moral concepts implies that 
moral properties are non-natural. 
26 See Hume (1739, III, I, 1) and Mackie (1977).  
27 For a discussion of codifiability with which I am sympathetic, see McDowell (1979) and (1981). 
answer to a moral question. Correct moral judgements may well be (indeed, I think they are) 
essentially uncodifiable in this sense. Moral externalism isn’t even committed to the claim 
that there is always a determinate answer, one way or another, on every moral question. The 
kind of moral realism to which moral externalism is committed allows for a certain amount of 
vagueness in morality. All that is required is that when there is a determinate answer to a 
moral question, the answer is determinate independently of the beliefs and motives of 
subjects.28  
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has been primarily concerned with the implications of externalism about 
representational content for the nature of moral judgements and the nature of moral reasons. 
The resulting view, moral externalism, provides a way in which moral judgements can be 
internally connected to motivation even though it is possible to fail to be motivated by one’s 
sincere moral judgements; and it provides a way in which moral reasons can be essentially 
action-guiding even though objective. The view is at route externalist, but goes some way 
towards incorporating underlying internalist intuitions. The view is also part of a broader 
view according to which norms of thought and action are objective in being determined by 
the world beyond the individual, but do not as a result lie essentially beyond her grasp.29 
 
References 
Blackburn, S. (1984) Spreading the Word (New York: Oxford University Press). 
——— (1998) Ruling Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Burge, T. (1977) ‘Belief De Re’, Journal of Philosophy 74: 338-62. 
——— (1979) ‘Individualism and the Mental’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73-121. 
——— (1982) ‘Other Bodies’, in A. Woodfield (ed.) Thought and Object: Essays on 
Intentionality (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
——— (1986a) ‘Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind’, Journal of Philosophy 83: 
697-720. 
                                                             
28 Thanks to Michael Morris for helping to clarify the issues of vagueness and objectivity. 
29 There are obvious parallels here between epistemic norms and moral norms. For a discussion of the 
implications of externalism about representational content for epistemic norms specifically, see Burge (2003) 
and Majors and Sawyer (2005). 
——— (1986b) ‘Individualism and Psychology’, Philosophical Review 95: 3-45. 
——— (1986c) ‘Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception’, in P. Pettit and J. 
McDowell (eds) Subject, Thought, and Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
——— (1988) ‘Authoritative Self-Knowledge and Perceptual Individualism’, in R. H. 
Grimm and D. D. Merrill (eds), Contents of Thought (Tucson, AZ.: University of 
Arizona Press). 
——— (2003) ‘Perceptual Entitlement’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67: 
503-48. 
Brink, D. (1986) ‘Externalist Moral Realism’, Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement: 
23-42. 
——— (1989) Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
——— (1997) ‘Moral Motivation’, Ethics 108: 4-32. 
Copp, D. (1997) ‘Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith’s “The Moral Problem” ’, 
Ethics 108: 33-54. 
Cuneo, T. (1999) ‘An Externalist Solution to the “Moral Problem” ’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 59: 359-80. 
Dancy, J. (2000) Practical Reality  (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
Darwall, S. (1983) Impartial Reason  (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press). 
Davies, M. (1991) ‘Individualism and Perceptual Content’, Mind 100: 461-84. 
——— (1992) ‘Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society 92: 21-45. 
Falk, W. D. (1947) ‘ “Ought” and Motivation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 48: 
111-38.  
Foot, P. (1958a) ‘Moral Arguments’, Mind 67: 502-13. 
——— (1958b) ‘Moral Beliefs’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59: 83-104. 
——— (1972) ‘Morality as a System of hypothetical Imperatives’, Philosophical Review 81: 
305-16. 
Gert, J. (2004) Brute Rationality: Normativity and Human Action (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
Goldman, A. (2009) Reasons from Within: Desires and Values (New York: Oxford 
University Press). 
Greenberg, M. (2009) ‘Moral Concepts and Moral Motivation’, Philosophical Perspectives 
23: 137-64. 
Hare, R. M. (1952) The Language of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press). 
Harman, G. (1977) The Nature of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press). 
Hume (1739) A Treatise of Human Nature, P. H. Nidditch (ed.) (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1978). 
Korsgaard, C. (1986) ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason’, in her Creating the Kingdom of 
Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Mackie, J. L. (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin) 
Majors, B. & Sawyer, S. (2005) ‘The Epistemological Argument for Content Externalism’, 
Philosophical Perspectives 19: 257-80. 
——— (2007) ‘Entitlement, Opacity and Connection’, in S. Goldberg (ed.) Internalism and 
Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
McDowell, J. (1978) ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’ Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 52: 13-29. 
——— (1979) ‘Virtue and Reason’, The Monist 62: 331-50. 
——— (1981) ‘Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following’, in S. Holtzman & C. Leich (eds) 
Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul). 
——— (1984) ‘De Re Senses’, Philosophical Quarterly 34: 283-94. 
——— (1985) ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’, in T. Honderich (ed.) Morality and 
Objectivity (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul). 
——— (1986) ‘Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space’, in P. Pettit & J. McDowell 
(eds) Subject, Thought, and Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
McNaughton, D. (1988) Moral Vision (Oxford: Blackwell). 
Mele, A. (1996) ‘Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness’, Ethics 106: 727-53. 
Nagel, T. (1970) The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon). 
Parfit, D. (1997) ‘Reasons and Motivation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 
71: 99-131. 
Putnam, H. (1973) ‘Meaning and Reference’, Journal of Philosophy 70: 699-711. 
Sawyer, S. (2003) ‘Sufficient Absences’, Analysis 63: 202-8. 
——— (2007) ‘There is No Viable Notion of Narrow Content’ in B. McLaughlin & J. Cohen 
(eds) Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell). 
——— (2011) ‘Internalism and Externalism in Mind’, in J. Garvey (ed.) The Continuum 
Companion to the Philosophy of Mind (London: Continuum). 
——— (2014) ‘The Importance of Fictional Properties’ in A. Everett and S. Brock (eds) 
Fictional Objects (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Sayre-McCord, G. (1997) ‘The Metaethical Problem’, Ethics 108: 55-83. 
Scanlon, T. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 
Schroeder, M. (2007) Slave of the Passions (New York: Oxford University Press). 
Shafer-Landau, R. (1998) ‘Moral Motivation and Moral Judgement’, Philosophical Quarterly 
48: 353-8. 
——— (2000) ‘A Defence of Motivational Externalism’, Philosophical Studies 97: 267-91. 
——— (2003) Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon). 
Smith, M. (1994) The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell). 
——— (1995) ‘Internal Reasons’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55: 109-31. 
——— (1997) ‘In Defense of “The Moral Problem”: A Reply to Brink, Copp, and Sayre-
McCord’, Ethics 108: 84-119. 
Stocker, M. (1979) ‘Desiring the Bad’, Journal of Philosophy 76: 738-53. 
Svavarsdóttir, S. (1999) ‘Moral Cognitivism and Motivation’, Philosophical Review 108: 
161-219. 
Williams, B. (1980) ‘Internal and External Reasons’, in R. Harrison (ed.) Rational Action 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Wong, D. B. (2006) ‘Moral Reasons: Internal and External’, Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 72: 536-58. 
Zangwill, N. (2003) ‘Externalist Moral Motivation’, American Philosophical Quarterly 40: 
143-54. 
